Vol. 38 No. 1 (2018)
Articles

Moral Deliberation, Belief and Acceptance

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  • Mariano Garreta Leclercq
Mariano Garreta Leclercq
Universidad de Buenos Aires - CONICET - CIF
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2018.279

Published 2018-05-01

Keywords

  • Justificación de creencias,
  • Justificación de acciones,
  • Costo del error,
  • Injerencia pragmática,
  • Aceptación
  • Justification of Belief,
  • Justification of Action,
  • Cost of Error,
  • Pragmatic Encroachment,
  • Acceptance
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Abstract

This paper is aimed at proving that in certain contexts of action there may be a cleavage between the moral knowledge of an agent and the moral justification of her actions. I will argue that this is so when two conditions obtain: first, acting on the basis of false beliefs may end-up being very costly in terms of the welfare of those affected; and second, even if low, the probability of such negative upshots are significant or not trivial. I shall claim that this cleavage between knowledge and justification of actions has important consequences for the structure of moral deliberation.

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