Vol. 40 No. 2 (2020)
Discussions

Construction, Preservation, and the Presence of Self in Observer Memory: A Reply to Trakas

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  • Christopher Jude McCarroll
Christopher Jude McCarroll
Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, France
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.371

Published 2020-11-01

Keywords

  • Memoria episódica;,
  • Memoria de observador,
  • Perspectivas visuales,
  • Imagen mental,
  • Teorías de la memoria,
  • Presencia del yo
    • ...More
    Less
  • Episodic memory,
  • Observer Memory,
  • Visual Perspective,
  • Mental Imagery,
  • Theories of Memory,
  • Self-Presence
    • ...More
    Less
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Abstract

Observer memories involve a representation of the self in the memory image, which is presented from a detached or external point of view. That such an image is an obvious departure from how one initially experienced the event seems relatively straightforward. However, in my book on this type of imagery, I suggested that such memories can in fact, at least in some cases, accurately represent one’s past experience of an event. During these past events there is a sense in which we adopt an external perspective on ourselves. In the present paper, I respond to a critical notice of my book by Marina Trakas. Trakas argues that my account of observer memory unfolded against the background of a problematic preservationist account of episodic memory, and that I failed to adequately account for the presence of self in observer memory. I respond these worries here, and I try to clarify key points that were underdeveloped in the book.

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