Vol. 42 No. 2 (2022)
Thematic section

The Adoption Problem and the Normative Status of Logic

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  • Sergio Adrián Chamorro
Sergio Adrián Chamorro
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.385

Published 2022-11-11

Keywords

  • Normativity,
  • Adoption,
  • Inferential Practices
  • Normatividad,
  • Adopción,
  • Prácticas inferenciales
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Abstract

Logic, as some authors hold, is a normative discipline. It helps us tell right from wrong in the context of inferences, and it influences our inferential practices. On the other hand, Kripke and Padró’s Adoption Problem shows us that there is no  sense in the idea of adopting logical principles. Through a comparison with different interpretations of the idea of normativity in logic, I will analyze the compatibility between both positions. The apparent disconnection between what is right and the practices of the agents, added to the norm’s impotence to influence inferential  practices, will lead to a not so encouraging conclusion for those who want to hold both positions: if we accept that the adoption problem is a real problem, then we have to erase every trace of normativity from our conception of logic.

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