Vol. 43 No. 2 (2023)
Articles

Is a Whole Prior to its Parts?

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  • Angelo Briones
Angelo Briones
IIF-SADAF-CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e543

Published 2023-11-01

Keywords

  • Mereology,
  • Identity dependence,
  • Identity criterion,
  • Ontological priority
  • Mereología,
  • Dependencia de identidad,
  • Criterio de identidad,
  • Prioridad ontológica
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Abstract

The main objective of the present research is to expose a problem of coherence in which the theories according to which there are mereological wholes that are prior to the parts that compose them incur. The central argument consists in showing that the dependence of identity that the parts have with the wholes they compose, which defines the ontological priority of the whole with respect to its parts, implies a principle of identity from which it can be established that, at the same time, the wholes depend for their identity on their parts, so that the parts are ontologically prior to the whole they compose. Thus, the theory collapses in a vicious circle that threatens the very notion of identity dependence. For this reason, the theory cannot coherently sustain the thesis according to which the wholes are ontologically prior to their parts.

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