Vol. 33 No. 1 (2013): Homenaje a Eugenio Bulygin I
Articles

Proposiciones normativas y objetividad: Revisión de un problema

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  • Ricardo Caracciolo
Ricardo Caracciolo
Universidad de Córdoba / Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2013.91

Published 2013-05-01

Keywords

  • Norma,
  • Proposición normativa,
  • Objetividad,
  • Validez normativa
  • Norm,
  • Normative proposition,
  • Objectivity,
  • Normative validity
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Abstract

Eugenio Bulygin supports the thesis according to which the objectivity of law depends on the objectivity of the knowledge of law. This thesis depends on the distinction between norms and normative propositions. Normative propositions are those that must express this knowledge, insofar as they are apt to be true or false, contrary to norms. Thus, this objectivity is a function of the truth conditions of these propositions. Also, as facts only exist in the empirical dimension according to Bulygin, these conditions can only refer to this class of circumstances. However, the Kelsenian distinction between subjective and objective senses and the idea of "normative validity", this article claims, poses a problem for this way of understanding normative propositions when it comes to explaining the objectivity of law.

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References

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