Vol. 33 No. 1 (2013): Homenaje a Eugenio Bulygin I
Articles

El alcance (acotado) del escepticismo moral

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  • Martín Farrell
Martín Farrell
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2013.92

Published 2013-05-01

Keywords

  • Metaethics,
  • Moral skepticism
  • Metaética,
  • Escepticismo moral
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Abstract

Moral skepticism maintains that moral propositions are no true, nor false, according with the correspondence theory of truth, and the coherence theory of truth is not applicable in morality. To refute it, somebody has to prove the existence of moral facts, or demostrate that coherence is a sufficient condition for a good moral theory. According the paper, this cannot be done.

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