Vol. 33 No. 1 (2013): Homenaje a Eugenio Bulygin I
Articles

Consistencia mediante jerarquía

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  • J. J. Moreso
J. J. Moreso
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2013.95

Published 2013-05-01

Keywords

  • Sistemas normativos,
  • Derogación,
  • Jerarquía de normas,
  • Consistencia normativa,
  • Lógica deóntica,
  • Alchourrón,
  • Bulygin
    • ...More
    Less
  • Normative systems,
  • Derogation,
  • Hierarchies of norms,
  • Normative consistency,
  • Deontic logic,
  • Alchourrón,
  • Bulygin
    • ...More
    Less
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Abstract

In this contribution, I shall intend to show that the criterion lex superior derogat legi inferiori has a consequence which, as far as I know, has not been noted yet: if the higherlevel norms in a legal system, i.e. constitutional norms, configure a consistent set, then necessarily the legal system is consistent. Lex superior preserves necessarily the consistency, as it were. If higher-level norms are members of a consistent set, then the lower-levels could admit no norm in contradiction with the higher-level norms. Moreover, given that from a contradiction follows anything, in virtue of the logical principle ex falso quodlibet, from two contradictory lower-level norms follow some norms in contradiction with norms of the higher-level, thus contradictory norms could never be admit in the lower-levels.

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