Vol. 36 No. 1 (2016)
Articles

Varieties of Skepticism and Anti-Skepticism

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  • Manuel Pérez Otero
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2016.29

Published 2016-05-01

Keywords

  • Skeptical and Anti-Skeptical Positions,
  • Radical Skepticism,
  • Transcendental Arguments,
  • Brains in a Vat,
  • Putnam
  • Posiciones escépticas y antiescépticas,
  • Escepticismo radical,
  • Argumentos trascendentales,
  • Cerebros en una cubeta,
  • Putnam
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Abstract

The goal of this article is to provide several elements for an appropriate understanding of the diverse dialectics between skepticism and anti-skepticism in epistemology. In particular (against some anti-skeptical strategies), to demonstrate that a certain skeptical thesis is false or cannot be coherently defended may be insufficient to solve the conceptual problem posed by a certain skeptical argument for the thesis. I include a discussion of the force and limits of transcendental arguments, as well as an analysis of the structure of that kind of arguments, illustrated by Putnam's argument against the epistemic possibility of being a brain in a vat.

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