Vol. 43 No. 2 (2023)
Discussions

Meaning Scepticism, Factualism and Anti-realism

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  • Pedro Diego Karczmarczyk
Pedro Diego Karczmarczyk
Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Argentina / Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Argentina.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e507

Published 2023-11-01

Keywords

  • Realismo,
  • Factualismo deflacionario,
  • Escepticismo semántico,
  • Criterio,
  • Seguimiento de reglas
  • Realism,
  • Deflationary Factualism,
  • Meaning Scepticism,
  • Criterion,
  • Rule-following
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Abstract

In this paper I take up my discussion with Pérez Otero concerning Wittgenstein’s interpretation. I defend the thesis that Wittgenstein’s grammatical analysis implies that attributions of understanding and rule-following have a retrospective character, in agreement with the analysis of the grammar of “capacity”, which attributes “states” to objects according to their effects. I point out that this thesis does not led to an incoherent anti-realistic position, because it is an integral part of the deflationary factualism that we find in the “sceptical solution” proposed by Kripke in his interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. In contrast, we point out the inconsistency of positions that attempt to limit their anti-realistic moment to the critique of subjectivist mentalist truth conditions. I analyze the difficulties of this conception in the elucidation of the concept of criterion, and show how a sceptical elucidation of this concept avoids these difficulties.

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