Vol. 42 No. 2 (2022)
Thematic section

Logical rules and change of inferential practice

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  • Romina Padró,
  • Eduardo A. Barrio
Romina Padró
Saul Kripke Center, City University of New York, New York, USA
Eduardo A. Barrio
IIF-SADAF-CONICET / Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.949

Published 2022-11-11

Keywords

  • Revisión de la lógica,
  • Antiexcepcionalismo lógico,
  • Normatividad,
  • Problema de la Adopción
  • Revision of Logic,
  • Logical Anti-exceptionalism,
  • Normativity,
  • Adoption Problem
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Abstract

Can we adopt a rule of inference as if it were a hypothesis and infer something by virtue of the rule? Can we revise our logical rules and principles considering the available evidence? Logical anti-exceptionalism challenges the idea that logic is exceptional. Logic and all other scientific theories are connected. However, the challenge of adoption posed by Kripke and Padró impose limits on this conception. This section explores different aspects related to the impossibility of adopting rules, anti-exceptionalism, revision and the normativity of logic.

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