Vol. 44 Nro. 1 (2024)
Critical Notes

Linguistic Practice, Content and Rationality without Insurance: About Tiempo, Pensamiento y Vulnerabilidad: Una investigación sobre la dinámica cognitiva by Paulo Faria

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  • Eduardo García-Ramírez
Eduardo García-Ramírez
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Ceintíficas y Tecnológicas, Buenos Aires, Argentina / Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e971

Published 2024-05-07

Keywords

  • Antiindividualismo,
  • Transparencia,
  • Validez,
  • Control
  • Anti-individualism,
  • Transparency,
  • Validity,
  • Control
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Abstract

Faria (2021) offers an extraordinary discussion concerning topics that are rarely treated in relation with each other: change in mental content, its relevance for inferential validity and its consequences for agential responsibility (both in action and thought). Faria’s (2021) goal is to defend that the impermanence of content, the vulnerability of ordinary inferences, the role of luck and the lack of control in our thoughts and actions are inescapable elements of ordinary life. In this paper I will argue that Faria’s arguments are successful, yet I will cast doubt over the specific consequences that Faria draws from them. I will show that, even though there is in fact impermanence, vulnerability and luck, they are not overwhelming and, thus, do not modify our intuitive understanding of contents, beliefs and rationality.

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